This paper examines the characteristics of entry level academic economists and investigates the determinants of market salaries. Contrary to what might be expected, we find that nominal salaries are not systematically adjusted to reflect observable differences in the cost of living. Our findings reveal that being hired on the tenure track significantly influence academic salaries regardless of departmental ranking. After analyzing the factors that influence salaries, we analyze the impact that observable characteristics have on the probability of being hired into tenure track positions. Completing a Ph.D. degree, being hired at a public university, and receiving a degree from a highly ranked department were found to be significant characteristics of those hired into tenure track positions.
Introduction
When examining salaries in labor markets, economists observe the characteristics of individual workers, employers, and jobs and seek to measure their impact on wages and salaries.
In this paper we investigate and report on the determinants of salaries in the academic labor market for entry level economists. Previous studies focussing on this market have explored the impact of gender and age on salaries. [ (Formby et al. 1993) , (Barbezat 1992) , (Raymond et al. 1988), and (McMillen and Singell 1994) ]. The effects of academic reputation and departmental rankings of Ph.D. programs from which newly hired economists receive their degrees have also been investigated (Ehrenberg et al. 1998 ). This ranking could be a proxy for the quality of the training economists receive as graduate students and indirectly indicate expected future productivity.
Recently, Siegfried and Stock (1999) provided a more extensive analysis of the labor market for entry level economists by examining employment outcomes and salaries of a large sample of new Ph.D.'s and whether they accepted jobs in academia, worked for a government agency, or went into the private sector. Their findings provide compelling evidence of how salaries vary across these broad sectors. This paper is more narrowly focussed and reports on the results of a survey of the academic labor market for persons hired at the beginning of the1998-1999 academic year. The survey is similar in design to the one used by Formby et al. (1993) , which reported results for the 1987-1988 academic year. An aggressive follow-up strategy resulted in a response rate of over 66 percent, which yields reliable information on the salaries and characteristics of economists hired into the academic labor market in 1998.
We note at the outset that in some ways our findings relating to determinants of salary are not surprising because they confirm what until now was widely suspected but not tested. For example, it is not surprising that being hired on the tenure track results in a large and highly significant salary premium. However, we are able to provide information about how many economists are being hired into tenure tack and nontenure track positions and about other factors influencing salaries. Further, we show that there is a strong correlation between the ranking of the department in which the new hire did their Ph.D. work and their salary, in addition to their placement.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly describe the survey and highlight several interesting descriptive statistics. Next, we specify an earnings model and discuss the data used in analyzing salaries. In the third part of the paper we report results that show how being hired on the tenure track affects the entry-level salary of new hires and we present other variables explaining academic salaries. The fourth section reports on the characteristics of persons hired on the tenure track. The final section presents brief concluding remarks.
The Survey and A Brief Discussion of Changes in Entry Level Hiring Across Time
Colleges and universities that were seeking to hire academic economists for the 1998-1999 academic year were identified in two ways. First, we compiled a list of all academic institutions that advertised in the October or November 1997 issues of Job Openings for Economists (JOE). To this list we added all colleges and universities that advertised open positions for economists in The Chronicle of Higher Education. An easily completed survey form was mailed to 675 potential employers and a total of 450 responses were received. Some responses were initially incomplete and extensive follow-up resulted in additional complete surveys. However, in a number of cases we were unsuccessful in filling in missing data and these partial responses were not analyzed. Of the 450 complete responses, 42 were not useable because we were not able to obtain salary information. An additional 58 responses had other demographic information missing, rendering them unusable. One hundred seventy nine of those 4 responding noted that no new hires had been made at the entry level. Of the 450 responses received, we were able to construct a complete data set with 207 observations. 1 This sample is somewhat smaller than the similar survey of Formby et al. (1993) , which collected similar information for a decade earlier. Formby et al. (1993) .
Thus, on average, real entry level salaries rose by slightly less than 9 percent over the decade separating the surveys. Several other summary statistics of general interest warrant mention. Second, unlike previous studies, the current paper focuses on the salary differences of those hired on and off the tenure track. Table 1 hiring on and off the tenure track has increased cannot be addressed because earlier surveys were not designed to address this issue.
The Earning Equation and Data
The literature from labor economics suggests that the proper form for estimating an earnings equation for entry-level economists is:
where E i denotes the salary of the ith entry level economist, X j refers to a vector of earnings determinants, b j represents the parameters to be estimated, and U i is an error term with a zero mean and constant variance.
The explanatory variables used in estimating the earnings equation are shown in Table 2 .
The meaning of most of the variables are clear and require little comment, but others are not as clear and we briefly discuss them here. The first set of variables in Table 2 relate to characteristics of the departments hiring an entry level economist or characteristics of the 3. In Formby et al. (1993) the ranking of departments came from Hirsch et al. (1984) . We use the ranking of Scott and Mitias (1996) which is a more current ranking which reflects changes in productivity that occurred over the decade. The methodology used in each is similar, though not the same.
department at which the new hire studied for the Ph.D. degree. The H-productivity variable measures the number of pages published from 1984 through 1993 by the faculty in the school that hired the new entry-level economist. The P-productivity variable measures the number of pages published over the same period by the faculty in the department in which the new hire did her/his Ph.D. work. These productivity variables are sometimes interpreted as proxies for the quality of departments hiring and producing economists in the entry level market for economists.
Observations of H-productivity and P-productivity come from Scott and Mitias (1996) , who sequentially rank the top 240 departments.
The COL index number requires some explanation. We used the Cost of Living calculator found on the website of www.homefair.com. This website provides a measure of the change in the cost of living, holding income constant, for a person who moves from one city to another in the fall of 1998. For our purposes we chose a city (Orlando, FL) with an index value of 100 as the base. We then calculated the cost of living in the area of interest, assuming the new hire moved there from an area with an index value of 100. In those cases where the hiring department was located in area that was not available at www.homefair.com, a Rand McNally map and www.homefair.com were used to identify the closest geographical area with similar population size that had an index number. The COL of this area is used as a proxy for the COL in the area where the college or university involved in hiring is located.
Highest Degree and Business School are categorical variables indicating whether the hiring department offers a Ph.D. degree and whether it is administratively located in a business school. Hires is also a categorical variable that indicates whether the hiring department employed two or more new entry level economists rather than one.
The second set of variables in Table 2 relates to the personal characteristics of individual entry level economists hired into academic positions in the fall of 1998. The Ph.D. variable indicates whether the newly hired economist had a completed degree when she/he started working. The Gender variable requires no comment.
Variables 1-10 were analyzed by Formby et al. (1993) in their study of the determinants of 1986-1987 entry level salaries of academic economists. To these we add the variables numbered 11-14, all of which are categorical. We asked for information on both race and country of national origin. Sample sizes were very small for African Americans, and for this reason we coded the data to create a variable indicating whether the new hire was a white nonHispanic person (n = 158) or "other" (n = 49), with the latter group including African Americans, persons of Hispanic origin, and Asians. The variable Published indicates whether the new hire had published a paper (or had a paper accepted for publication) at the time the survey instrument was completed. Surprisingly, Table 1 reveals that more than 60 percent of all new hires were reported by their hiring department to have published at least one paper. It should be noted, however, that we did not ask about the quality of the publication. There is a great deal of difference in a publication that appeared in a working paper series or in a refereed journal.
Tenure Track shows whether an individual was hired on the tenure track. As noted above, slightly more than 20 percent of the sample were in nontenure track jobs. Citizen/Green Card indicates whether the person hired was a U.S. citizen or held a green card.
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The Determinants of Entry Level Academic Salaries, 1998-1999 Table 3 reports estimates for two alternative models. Model 1 is shown in column 1 and is estimated using all observations. Model 2 reports separate estimates for ranked and unranked departments. Column 2 reports estimates for ranked departments and column 3 shows similar estimates for unranked departments.
4. We group economists with green cards with U.S. citizens because the number of green card holders is small and they have the same rights to employment as U.S. citizens.
The rankings of Scott and Mitias (1996) reveal that the department ranked last among 240 departments published only 33.7 pages over a nine year span, which translates to 3.74 pages per year. We therefore coded all unranked departments as having a productivity measure of zero.
For ranked departments, an insignificant positive coefficient on H-productivity would seem problematic. 5 What the data suggest is that more productive departments hire persons from highly productive departments. The positive and significant sign on P-productivity shows that persons receiving degrees from more productive departments receive salary premiums. These persons from higher ranked departments are hired into higher ranked departments and consequently receive a salary premium partly due to their producing department. The data show that no person hired in the top 10 departments received their degree from a department ranked lower than 10, suggesting that higher ranked schools seek out persons from their own ranks.
Comparing the effects of the variables across the estimates in the two models yields some interesting findings. In the discussion that follow we employ a difference of difference technique, which allows us to make positive statements about the significance of variables in the estimates, reported in Table 3 . Table 3 indicates that whether the hiring department is in a public or private university has no significant effect on the salary of the new hire once other determinants of entry level salaries are taken into account. There are three other variables that have no significant effect in either Model 1 or 2 --COL, Gender, and Published. The fact that COL is not significant is mildly surprising. The obvious explanation for this is that departments that are located in areas that have higher costs of living also offer compensating amenities that offset these costs. This is consistent with a literature that documents the existence of amenities that enhance the quality of 5. Ehrenberg et al. (1998) show, among other things, that more productive (higher ranked) departments pay life in urban areas. 6 Nevertheless, these compensating amenities may not fully offset differences in costs of living (cf., DuMond et al., 2000) and our expectations were that COL would be positive and significant.
Gender had a negative coefficient (being male had a negative impact on wages), but consistent with Formby et al. (1993) the coefficient is insignificant. The fact that Published was insignificant is not all that surprising given possible range in publication quality.
Consistent with the results of a decade earlier, we find that being hired into a business school has a significant and positive effect on salaries in Model 1 and for persons hired into ranked departments in Model 2. In unranked departments, being hired into a department within a business school has no significant impact upon salary. Some departments hired more than one entry-level economist in 1998-1999. For example, one responding department reported hiring six entry-level faculty in one year. The fact some departments were making multiple hires led us to investigate whether a search for several higher salaries to new hires.
6. See, for example, Roback (1981 Roback ( , 1988 and Blomquist, Berger, and Hoehn (1988) .
economists might impact the salaries of the new hires. For the entire survey (Model 1), this variable was positive and significant, a result that parallels the findings of Formby et al. (1993) .
The analysis reveals that the most interesting contributor to entry level salaries is whether the new hire is on the tenure track. We used Chow tests to investigate whether structural differences existed when alternative models were estimated. Results for the Chow tests are reported in Table 4 . There were structural differences when the data was separated by whether or not the department was ranked.
Chow tests for Business School and Tenure Track indicate that a structural difference was present.
Characteristics of Those Hired on the Tenure Track
Tenure track status was the only variable that was significant in all specifications and it is clearly a powerful determinant for the entire survey across all departments, ranked as well as unranked. The survey provides information that allows us to examine the characteristics of those hired on the tenure track vis-à-vis those hired into nontenure track positions. Table 5 reports the results of a Probit analysis that investigates the significant characteristics of those hired on the tenure track. In specifying the Probit model we note that several of the variables are specific to the individual. For example Race, Gender, Published, CitizenGreen Card, and Ph.D. are clearly 7. To analyze the effects of categorical variables on entry level salaries in 1998-1999 we apply Kennedy's (1981) dummy variable procedure to the earnings equations in Model 2 of Table 3 to derive exact premiums. Being hired on the tenure track generates an exact premium of 21.3 percent in ranked departments and a smaller, but still sizeable 12.8 percent in unranked departments. It is of interest to note that the exact premiums associated with Tenure Track are larger than the raw survey salary differential reported in Table 1 . Thus, once other things are held individual specific. In addition, we interpret P-Productivity as indirectly reflecting the potential productivity of the new hire. The logic of this is straightforward: ceteris paribus, a department with a highly productive research faculty is expected to produce Ph.D. students that are well trained and productive themselves. The other variables in Table 5 (H-Productivity, Public, Highest Degree, Business School, New Hires, and Ranked) all measure characteristics of the hiring department.
We find that three variables are highly significant. Accepting a position at a public institution (Public), having completed all requirements for the Ph.D. degree (Ph.D.), and receiving graduate training in a department with a highly productive research faculty (PProductivity) were all significant characteristics in attaining tenure track positions.
The following discussion examines the magnitude of the influence that Public, Ph.D. and P-Productivity had on distinguishing the tenured from nontenured. To address this issue we use procedures outlined by Greene (1993, 636-643) and the results in Table 5 . To interpret Table 6 requires a brief discussion of the characteristics used in constructing the 'baseline' measure we employ in gauging the impacts of the variables. The characteristics of the "representative" or "average" new hire are used in constructing the baseline. For H-Productivity and P-Productivity the data reveal that the average level of production of the producing department was 2149, corresponding to a ranking of 22. The data also show that, on average, a new hire received a job at a department with a productivity level of 637, corresponding to a ranking of 66, 44 slots lower than the productivity of producing departments. Therefore, in constructing the baseline we use 2149 for the productivity of the producing department and 637 for the hiring department. 8 The data reveal that, on average, more new hires were made by public institutions. Further, the constant in an earnings equation, being hired on the tenure track contributes more to salary than the raw survey data suggest.
average new hire was at a department that did not offer a Ph.D. and was not in a department administratively located in a business school. On average, the potential hire reported having completed all degree requirements and was a white (nonHispanic) male. As stated earlier, 62 percent of the new hires in the survey had at least one publication. Moreover, most of the new hires were U.S. citizens or had green cards and most departments hired only one entry-level person in 1998-1999. Table 6 reveals that this baseline new hire had a 82 percent probability of being a tenure track hire. This is interesting in itself but when any of the characteristics of this individual is changed, the significance of that particular variable is more clearly revealed. Ceteris paribus, if the new hire was hired at a private institution instead of a public institution the probability of being a tenure track hire falls by approximately 5 percentage points. The most dramatic effect takes place if the new hire has not fulfilled all of her/his degree requirements. There is a 24.7
percentage point drop in the probability that a nondegreed economist, in our sample, would be hired on the tenure track. Table 6 reveals that the productivity of the producing department had a positive and systematic impact on the probability that an entry-level economist was hired into a tenure track position. Ceteris paribus, if we assume that the new hire receives her/his training in the most productive department instead of the 22 nd ranked department, the probability of being hired on the tenure track increases by approximately 8 percentage points.
Conclusions
This study used survey data to investigate the determinants of entry-level salaries of academic economists in the 1998-1999 academic year. We identified a number factors that influence salaries in the academic labor market. We found Tenure Track to be a large, significant track adds more than 21 percent to the entry-level salary. In unranked departments the tenure track premium is almost 13 percent.
The paper also investigates the characteristics of economists hired in tenure track positions. Three variables are shown to be highly significant in distinguishing those that were hired into tenure track academic positions in economics. Having completed all requirements for the Ph.D. degree, accepting a position at a public institution, and receiving graduate training in a highly productive department all have large and significant effects on receiving a tenure track position.
departments received their training in higher ranked departments. 
